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TORT LAW
PHYSICIANs' LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF
CONFIDENTIALITY: BEYOND THE LIMITATIONS
OF THE PRIVACY TORT
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, South Carolina courts recognized the value of
confidentiality in doctor-patient communications. In South Carolina State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Hedgepath' the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that
physicians in South Carolina have a duty to maintain the confidentiality of doctor-
patient communications.2 Then in McCormick v. England the South Carolina
Court of Appeals took the next step and recognized a cause of action in tort for
breach of this duty of confidentiality.4 The unique nature of the doctor-patient
relationship is central to both of these decisions.
An excerpt from Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.5 perhaps best sets
out the defining characteristics of the doctor-patientrelationship. The Hammonds
court explained that "[w]hen a patient seeks out a doctor..., he must admit him to
the most private part of the material domain of man. Nothing material is more
important or more intimate to man than the health of his mind and body."6 The court
warned that complete candor is absolutely necessary to recovery, reasoning that
because "the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery" and cannot discern
medically relevant information from the irrelevant, the layman "must disclose all
information in his consultations with his doctor-even that which is embarrassing,
disgraceful or incriminating."7 In exchange for this complete disclosure, "the
medical profession extends the promise of secrecy."' Protecting the confidentiality
1. 325 S.C. 166, 480 S.E.2d 724 (1997).
2. Id. at 169, 480 S.E.2d at 726.
3. 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1997).
4. Id. at 643, 494 S.E.2d at 439.
5. 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Courts often quote Hammonds for its description of the
particular nature and significance of the doctor-patient relationship. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So.
2d 824,830 (Ala. 1973) (quoting language from Hammonds describing the doctor-patientrelationship).
6. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801.
7. Id.
8. Id. The promise of secrecy is embodied in the following passage from the I-ippocratic Oath,
taken by all physicians upon entering practice: "Whatever, in connection with my professional
practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of
abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." AM. Jun. 3D PROOF OF
FACTS Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 769 (15th ed. 1988).
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of doctor-patient communications may result in societal health benefits such as
accurate diagnosis and treatment. Moreover, "it is impossible to conceive of
countervailing benefits which would arise by according a physician the right to
gossip about a patient's health."9 The burden and challenge of protecting this
confidentiality falls upon "men of law" who must strive to establish the most
effective means for encouraging the complete candor that "men of medicine"
recognize as crucial to health and recovery.'0 South Carolina courts have risen to
this challenge by establishing a more effective theory for the enforcement and
promotion of doctor-patient confidentiality." In so doing, these South Carolina men
and women of law recognized a cause of action that makes it easier'2 for patients
to recover for a physician's breach of confidence and is well-suited ideologically
to address and deter this particular wrong.
Part II ofthis Note discusses South Carolina legal developments inthis area and
the significance of the Hedgepath and McCormick decisions. Part III describes the
nature and importance of the newly recognized cause of action. Finally, this Note
compares the doctor-patient breach of confidentiality tort with the "invasion of
privacy" tort, which has traditionally been used to address this particular wrong,"
and explains why the confidentiality tort is better suited, both practically and
ideologically, for recovery from physicians that disclose confidential doctor-patient
communications.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development ofPhysician-PatientRelationship Under South CarolinaLaw
In 1997 South Carolina courts squarely faced the issues of whether physicians
owe a duty of confidentiality to their patients and whether patients may recover in
tort for violations of this duty. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has
recognized the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship,'4 courts of
this state have consistently held that no statutory doctor-patient evidentiary privilege
exists in South Carolina." However, while some jurisdictions have looked to
9. Home, 287 So. 2d at 827.
10. Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 797.
11. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
12. Under the tort of breach of confidentiality, the patient need only show that (1) the doctor-
patient relationship existed, and (2) the doctor divulged information gained from the patient in the
course ofthis relationship to a third party. Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging
Tort, 82 COLUM. L. R'V. 1426, 1442, 1455 (1982).
13. Id. at 1426.
14. Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 608, 168 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1969).
15. See, e.g., Peaglerv. Atlantic CoastLine R.R., 232 S.C. 274,283, 101 S.E.2d 821,825 (1958)
(stating that while most states have enacted statutes establishing a physician-patient privilege, South
Carolina has not); Aakjer v. Spagnoli, 291 S.C. 165,173,352 S.E.2d 503, 503 (Ct. App. 1987) ("There
is no physician-patient privilege in South Carolina."). However, South Carolina does recognize, among
1272 [Vol. 49:1271
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doctor-patient evidentiary statutes as indications of the underlying public policy
justifying adoption of this tort, 6 South Carolina's lack of such an evidentiary
privilege did not prevent its recognition of the tort of breach of doctor-patient
confidence. Indeed, other jurisdictions with no doctor-patient evidentiary privilege
have recognized the tort.
7
B. Recognizing the Physician's Duty of Confidentiality
In Hedgepath, a medical disciplinary case, the South Carolina Supreme Court
faced the question of whether physicians in South Carolina have an "ethical duty
to maintain... patients' confidences."'" The controversy arose in the context of a
doctor-patient relationship between Dr. Larry L. Hedgepath and a married couple,
Mr. and Mrs. C.19 Doctor Hedgepath initially acted as a family therapist for the
couple and then later as the wife's individual therapist." During the couple's
subsequent divorce proceedings, and at the request of Mr. C's counsel, Dr.
Hedgepath voluntarily provided an affidavit2' without the consent of Mrs. C.' The
affidavit's contents were "not flattering" to Mrs. C and "revealed confidences
entrusted to him by Mrs. C. during their doctor-patient relationship. ' - Doctor
Hedgepath's disclosure was the subject of a disciplinary action brought before the
South Carolina Board of Medical Examiners.24 Finding that Dr. Hedgepath had
breached his ethical duty, the Board "imposed a public reprimand upon him."'25 On
appeal, the circuit court reversed the Board's decision,26 reasoning that Dr.
others, a spousal privilege, an attorney-client privilege, a priest-penitent privilege, a probation agent
privilege, and a professional health care provider privilege. See S.C. CODEANN. § 19-11-30 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1997) (spousal privilege); S.C. CODEANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (priest-penitent
privilege); S.C. CODEANN. § 24-21-290 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (probation agent privilege); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-71-10 to -20 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (professional health care provider privilege);
Drayton v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 205 S.C. 98, 31 S.E.2d 148 (1944) (attorney-client
privilege).
16. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1974) ("The physician-patient
privilege expresses a long-standing policy to encourage uninhibited communication between a
physician and his patient.").
17. See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 827 (Ala. 1973); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345,
348-49 (N.J. 1962).
18. South Carolina State Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs v. Hedgepath, 325 S.C. 166, 167,480 S.E.2d 724,
725 (1997).
19. Id. at 168, 480 S.E.2d at 725.
20. Id.
21. The affidavit was "not compelled by subpoena or other legal process." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Hedgepath, 325 S.C. at 167-68; 480 S.E.2d at 725.
25. Id. at 167, 480 S.E.2d at 725. At the time Dr. Hedgepath provided the affidavit, physicians
had an ethical duty to "respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals,
and [to] safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law." Id. at 168, 480 S.E.2d at 725
(quoting 26 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 81-60(D) (Supp. 1995)).
26. Id. at 168-69, 480 S.E.2d at 725-26.
3
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Hedgepath had no duty to refrain from disclosing information gained in his
professional capacity because "South Carolina does not recognize an evidentiary
doctor-patient privilege. 27 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's ruling,2" agreeing with the Board's finding that "[a] physician acts ethically
when she maintains patient confidences, and when she provides confidential
information to others as required by law or as authorized by the patient."29 As a
result, the court in Hedgepath imposed a duty of confidentiality on physicians with
regard to voluntarily disclosing their doctor-patient communications.
C. Recognizing a Cause ofAction for the Breach of this Duty
In McCormick v. England0 the South Carolina Court of Appeals, recognizing
the physician's duty of confidentiality established in Hedgepath, held that "South
Carolina shall recognize a cause of action for a physician's breach of a duty of
confidentiality."'" The holding in McCormick is essential if the supreme court's
decision in Hedgepath is to have any meaning. In contrast to redress through the
regulatory system, a tort cause of action more effectively deters a physician's
wrongful disclosure and thus encourages candor in doctor-patient relationships.
Both the physician's duty of confidentiality and the cause of action for its breach
could have been established in one decision.32 However, because Hedgepath was
a disciplinary action by a medical review board,33 thus not a private suit, the case
was ill-suited as a vehicle for the creation of a private cause of action.
The facts of McCormick are remarkably similar to those of Hedgepath. As a
family physician, Dr. England treated Mrs. McCormick, her former husband, and
the couple's children.34 In a contentious divorce action, Mrs. McCormick's husband
submitted a letter to the family court written by Dr. England and addressed "To
Whom It May Concern."'3 In his letter, Dr. England disclosed information gained
through his doctor-patient relationship with Mrs. McCormick, including that she
suffered from "major depression" and "acute and chronic alcoholism with binge
drinking episodes," with related "marital and family discord.., with both physical
27. Id. at 169, 480 S.E.2d at 726.
28. Id. (distinguishing "confidences" from "privileges" and noting that a physician's "duty to
maintain his client's confidences is independent of the issue [of]... whether those communications
are privileged").
29. Id.
30. 328 S.C. 627, 494 S.E.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1997).
31. Id. at 630, 494 S.E.2d at 432.
32. Some other jurisdictions have adopted both the physician's duty of confidentiality and the
cause of action for its breach in one case. See, e.g., Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d
667, 674 (Mo. 1993) (recognizing simultaneously both a duty of confidentiality and a cause of action
for its breach).
33. Hedgepath, 325 S.C. at 167, 480 S.E.2d at 725.
34. McCormick, 328 S.C. at 630, 494 S.E.2d at 432.
35. Id.
[Vol. 49:12711274
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and emotional rage episodes."'36 Doctor England further opined that Mrs.
McCormick was "a danger to herself and to her family" and "strongly
recommend[ed] that she be kept from the family and hospitalized against her
wishes. 37
Mrs. McCormick sued Dr. England on several causes of action, including
breach of confidence. The trial courtjudge granted Dr. England's motion to strike
the breach of confidence cause of action because no alleged "statutory duty of
confidentiality" applied.39 Thejudge noted that "' South Carolina does not recognize
the physician-patient privilege at common law."' 4 However, the court of appeals
reversed, reasoning that the lack of a physician-patient privilege in South Carolina
was not dispositive of the issue because an "evidentiary privilege" and the "duty of
confidentiality" are distinguishable, independent legal concepts.4'
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Importance of the New Cause ofAction
The decisions in Hedgepath and McCormick are not unique or radical. Rather,
they follow the modem trend explicitly recognized by the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in McCormick.42 The tort of a physician's breach of confidentiality has
been "defined in general terms as the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third
party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential
relationship."'43 Clearly, this tort emphasizes the sanctity of the physician's duty of
confidentiality-a duty that arises from the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient
relationship" and "out of broadly applicable societal norms and public policy
concerning the kind of relationship at issue."45 From a practical standpoint, the
36. Final Brief of Appellant at 2.
37. Id.
38. McCormick, 328 S.C. at 631, 494 S.E.2d at 433. The other causes of action included
negligence, libel, invasion of privacy, outrage, and civil conspiracy. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting the trial judge).
41. Id. at 634, 494 S.E.2d at 434.
42. Id. at 636, 494 S.E.2d at 435 (citing numerous jurisdictions that recognize "a cause of action
against a physician for the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information"). See generally Judy
E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician's Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential
InformationAbout Patient, 48 A.L.R.4th 668, 693-94 (1986) (explaining that many jurisdictions have
a cause of action for a physician's breach of confidentiality).
43. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1455.
44. The doctor-patient relationship is one of inherent trust and has long been recognized as such
by the South Carolina Supreme Court. See Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 608, 168 S.E.2d 82, 85
(1969).
45. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1451. Several courts, including the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in McCormick, have relied in part on the I-Iippocratic Oath's promise of secrecy to justify their
recognition of the cause of action. See McCormick, 328 S.C. at 635,494 S.E.2d at 435; see also Home
v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (Ala. 1973) (quoting the Hippocratic oath); Brandt v. Medical Defense
1998) TORT LAW 1275
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simplicity of the elements required to establish a prima facie case" should make it
easier for a plaintiff to recover from a physician who has disclosed confidential
information.
The breach of confidence cause of action focuses on the patient's rights, which
a physician violates by disclosing confidential information. First, the patient has a
right to avoid any injury resulting from the disclosure.47 Possible injuries include
reputational damage as well as more tangible harm.45 Second, the plaintiff has a
right to be secure in the confidential relationship and to rely on the "corresponding
expectation of secrecy" 49-- the expectation that ultimately prompted the
communication of confidential information in the first place.50 Moreover, society
has an interest in the promotion of "full disclosure necessary to effective medical
treatment" that is also violated by a physician's disclosure of confidential
information.5' When patients fear being candid with their doctors, the public health
could be adversely affected. These rights and interests are better protected under the
new breach of confidentiality tort than under the common alternative remedy, the
tort of invasion of privacy.
B. Invasion of Privacy and the Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort
1. Defining the Privacy Tort
South Carolina recognizes the invasion of the right to privacy tort. In Meetze
v. Associated Press2 the South Carolina Supreme Court defined the tort as an
"'unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of
one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or
cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities."' ' 3 The second branch, more commonly referred to as the public
Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667,671 n.1 (Mo. 1993) (same); Vassiliades v. Garf'mckel's, 492 A.2d 580,590-
91 n.5 (D.C. 1985) (same).
46. See supra note 12.
47. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1434.
48. Id. at 1435. Reputational injury can be actionable even if disclosure is made to a single person
or a small group of people. Id. The tangible effects can be varied and severe. See, e.g., Leger v.
Spurlock, 589 So. 2d 40, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that as a result of a doctor's breach of
confidentiality, the plaintiff's reputation and marriage suffered, criminal charges were brought against
him, and he was fired from his job); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (App. Div. 1982)
(repeating plaintiff's allegation that, because ofhis doctor's disclosure of confidential information, his
marriage deteriorated, he was fired, he experienced financial troubles, and he sought psychiatric
treatment for emotional distress).
49. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1434.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1435.
52. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
53. Id. at 335, 95 S.E.2d at 608 (quoting 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 2 (1942)). The American
1276 [Vol. 49:1271
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disclosure of private facts tort, most closely parallels the breach of confidentiality
tort. Therefore, comparing these two torts may illuminate the inherent limitations
of the public disclosure of private facts tort in providing plaintiffs redress against
physicians that disclose confidential information.
2. Limitations of the Public Disclosure ofPrivate Facts Tort
The public disclosure of private facts tort inadequately redresses a doctor's
breach of confidentiality because it does not "adequately recognize the distinct
interests present in a confidential relationship."54 At least one scholar has
commented that even "[a]fter ninety years of evolution, the common law private-
facts tort has failed to become a usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs"
and may even "have obscured analysis and impeded efforts to develop a more
effective and carefully tailored body of privacy-protecting laws.""5
The rights protected by the public disclosure of private facts tort56 are not as
broad as the rights protected by the breach of confidentiality tort. 7 The breach of
confidentiality tort focuses entirely on the confidential relationship between the
patient and the doctor, affording the patient recovery if the doctor acts inconsistently
with this relationship by disclosing confidential information in any manner to
anyone--even to a single person.5" In contrast, the public disclosure of private facts
tort ignores the individual's interest in the confidential relationship itself 9 While
the aim of the public disclosure of private facts tort may be to protect "the
individual's fundamental human dignity, ' the tort does so only to the extent that
its requirements regarding the type of information and the manner of
communication are satisfied. Thus, the nature of the public disclosure of private
facts tort is distinct from the breach of confidentiality tort.6' The various
Jurisprudence definition has only three branches of privacy; in contrast, the more common definition
has four separate branches: (1) appropriation; (2) unreasonable intrusion; (3) public disclosure of
private facts; and (4) false light in the public eye. W. PAGE KETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 851-63 (5th ed. 1984).
54. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1426 (The tort's "doctrinal principles and limitations make [it] ill-
suited to enforcement of confidences").
55. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELLL. REV. 291, 362 (1983).
56. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1434.
57. Id. at 1439.
58. Id. at 1442.
59. Id. at 1426.
60. Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 338.
61. The distinction has been aptly characterized as follows:
Privacy is a right against the public at large. Its doctrinal limits narrowly
circumscribe the zone of proscribed conduct in order to prevent hindrance of
public expression. In contrast, a right to confidentiality exists against a specific
person, who, by virtue of his relationship to the confider, has notice of the duty
to preserve the secrecy of clearly identifiable information. Privacy's doctrinal
limits are thus unnecessary in breach-of-confidence situations, and should not bar
1998] 1277
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requirements of the public disclosure of private facts tort, which limit its
effectiveness in enforcing and promoting the confidentiality of doctor-patient
communications, are discussed below.
a. The Publicity Requirement
In McCormick the South Carolina Court of Appeals explained that "the
gravamen of the tort [of public disclosure of private facts] is publicity as opposed
to mere publication."'62 This publicity requirement demands that "[t]he disclosure
of private facts must be a public disclosure, and not a private one... [; therefore,
c]ommunication to a single individual orto a small group of people... will not give
rise to liability."'63 Consider a situation in which a physician discloses confidential
information to an individual and then that individual publicizes the information.
Under the public disclosure of private facts tort, the physician may escape liability
even though the doctor-patient confidence was breached. However, the individual
may be held liable even if that individual owed no fiduciary duty to the patient.
Because the doctor is not deterred from making similar disclosures in the future, the
public disclosure of private facts tort is ill-suited to properly enforce and promote
confidential doctor-patient communications. In contrast, the breach of
confidentiality tort serves the desired deterrent function because it allows recovery
from a physician "if unauthorized disclosure is made to only one person not a party
to the confidence."
In Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit5 the plaintiff sought damages
for invasion of privacy by alleging that a lender disclosed confidential financial
information to a third party.66 The South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that no
evidence existed that the lender publicly disclosed the information and so the
plaintiff failed to meet the publicity requirement of the public disclosure of private
facts tort.67 As a result the trial court should not have allowed the invasion of
privacy issue to go to the jury.68
Courts have traditionally justified the requirement of "mass or widespread
recovery to plaintiffs deserving of a remedy.
Vickery, supra note 12, at 1440.
62. McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 640, 494 S.E.2d 431,437-38 (Ct. App. 1997).
63. Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119,124,314 S.E.2d 39, 43 (Ct. App. 1984); see also KEroN
ET AL., supra note 53, at 856 (stating a common-law requirement of public disclosure). But see id. at
857-58 (indicating that doubt exists as to whether public disclosure is required).
64. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1442.
65. 326 S.C. 426, 483 S.E.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1997).
66. Id. at 432, 483 S.E.2d at 792.
67. Id. at 436-37, 483 S.E.2d at 794; see also Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff did not meet the publicity requirement of the public disclosure of
private facts tort when the information concerning her pregnancy and possible abortion was
communicated only to her mother). Had the physician's breach of confidentiality tort been available
in Hobbs, the plaintiff may have prevailed.
68. Swinton Creek Nursery, 326 S.C. at 436-37, 483 S.E.2d at 794.
[Vol. 49:12711278
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communication as an element" of the public disclosure of private facts tort because
it avoids the "impossible legal tangle [that would result] if [courts] subjected back-
fence and front-parlor gossip to liability."69 Because the confidentiality tort is based
on the existence of an easily ascertainable doctor-patient relationship, it avoids
opening these floodgates by limiting actionable communications to those involving
the duty of confidentiality owed by a physician to a patient.
b. The Nature of Harm Requirement
As the South Carolina Court of Appeals explained in McCormick, a
communication actionable under the public disclosure of private facts tort must "be
highly offensive and likely to cause serious mental injury to a person of ordinary
sensibilities."'7 By focusing on the content of the information rather than its source,
this requirement is inconsistent "with the duty attaching to a confidential
relationship.""' Because the doctor's confidential relationship with the patient
encourages the patient's candor, any communication should be protected regardless
of its offensiveness.72 Moreover, as a practical matter, the offensiveness requirement
burdens recovery because the offensiveness of a given disclosure is subject to
debate.73 Finally, the "highly offensive to a reasonable person" standard applied in
the public disclosure of private facts tort74 is inappropriate in a breach of
confidentiality tort because "even hypersensitive people should have a right to be
secure in their confidential relationships."75
c. The "No Legitimate Public Interest" Requirement
For a communication to be actionable, the public disclosure of private facts tort
also requires that the matter is not subject to legitimate public interest.76 This
limitation is grounded in the "countervailing interest of the public right to know"77
and arises in the context of public figures and, in exceptional circumstances, private
69. Zimmerman, supra note 55, at 337.
70. McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 640, 494 S.E.2d 431, 438 (Ct. App. 1997).
71. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1441.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 504 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (Gaertner, J.,
dissenting) (illustrating that a reasonable couple might not find it offensive to have their participation
in an in vitro fertilization program made public); Doe v. Group Health Coop., 932 P.2d 178, 180, 182
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (illustrating, by reference to the lower court's ruling, that disclosure of a
plaintiff's "name and consumer number" may not be considered "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" even though "a reasonable person could infer from the context of the disclosure that [the
plaintiff] was a recipient of mental health treatment").
74. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1441.
75. Id.
76. McCormick v. England, 328 S.C. 627, 640, 494 S.E.2d 431, 438 (Ct. App. 1997).
77. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1442.
1998] TORT LAW 1279
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figures.78 Both public and private figures, however, have the same interests in
maintaining the confidentiality of doctor-patient communications. The confidential
nature of one's relationship with a physician is constant and does not change even
if the public becomes interested in the communication. No one should be without
a remedy if a physician voluntarily discloses confidential information in violation
of the rule in Hedgepath. "Subject to limited exceptions, private figures should not
lose their right of secrecy when the content of their confidential revelations is also
of legitimate public interest."'79 Additionally, "[p]ublic figures, because of their
relative lack of privacy, have at least as great, if not greater, need to be secure in
their confidential relationships as private individuals."8 Even under the theory that
public figures have waived their right to privacy, they should not be held to have
waived their right to confidential relationships.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hedgepath and McCormick, South Carolina seized the opportunity to
preserve the sanctity of doctor-patient communications. The newly adopted tort of
breach of a physician's duty of confidentiality allows patients to recover from
doctors that have breached this duty. Although the right to privacy sometimes
allows patients to recover, it "is a right against the public at large." 8' In contrast,
the right to confidentiality is a more personal right-one specific to the confidential
relationship. As a result, the breach of confidence tort is better suited to protect the
rights of patients and further society's goals than is the alternative public disclosure
of private facts tort.
Joseph Glenn White
78. See Snakenburgv. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164,171,383 S.E.2d2, 6 (Ct. App. 1989)
(articulating that under South Carolina law, "where the plaintiff [in a public disclosure of private facts
tort case] is a public figure, other considerations, including whether the defendant acted with malice,
may be relevant to establishing a cause of action").
79. Vickery, supra note 12, at 1443.
80. Id. at 1443-44.
81. Id. at 1440.
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